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ABSTRACT
It is argued that Adam Smith's use of Price Theory in Book. I of
the Wealth of Nations was no advance on what was known in 1776.
Furthermore, Smith introduced some innovations, such as the dichotomy
between goods and factor pricing, that had harmful long-run conse-
quences .
JEL classification: 031, History of Economic Thought

ADAM SMITH AND THE MARKET MECHANISM:
SEEMINGLY UNRELATED CONTEMPORARIES
I. One of the sharpest critics of the Wealth of Nations, Joseph
Schumpeter, felt forced to concede the merits of Adara Smith's Price
1
Theory
The rudimentary equilibrium theory of Chapter 7, by
far the best piece of economic theory turned out by
A. Smith, in fact points towards Say and, through
the latter's work, to Walras. The purely theoret-
ical developments of the nineteenth century consist
to a considerable degree in improvements upon it.
Schumpeter' s judgement has been widely accepted, all the more readily
because of Schumpeter' s little-disguised aversion to Smith. No one,
however, appears to have asked how far such a characterization serves
to indicate Smith's contribution . It may well be true that Chapter 7
is the best analytical effort of Smith and that it was very influen-
tial in the century to follow. But was it an improvement over what
was available in the latter half of the eighteenth century?
In 1901, Hannah Sewall had already provided an accurate forecast
2
of what was to be established by subsequent research.
So much was done [in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries] that there is scarcely any
proposition of importance in the modern discussion
of value which was not either stated or suggested
by the writers of this first period of economic
science, and which had not been discussed before
Adara Smith made political economy a world study.
In discussing Adara Smith's contributions to the theory of value
Paul Douglas expressed some embarrassment at the sesquicentennial of
3
the Wealth of Nations in 1926.
The contributions of Adara Smith to the theory
of value and of distribution were not great, and in
_1_
coraraeraorat ing the publication of Wealth of Nations
it might seem to be the path of wisdom to pass
these topics by in discreet silence
How is it that within twenty-five years this judgment would be quite
reversed, by Schumpeter, and subsequently by other scholars?
To avoid misunderstanding, it should be emphasized that 1 am not
concerned with the labor theory of value or the measure of value, a
topic satisfactorily discussed in the above essay by Douglas. Or with
Adam Smith's curious rules for the allocation of capital, an issue
which Smith's latest editors have considered one of the weakest points
of the Wealth of Nations : Nor with the roles of self-interest, the
Invisible Hand or the beneficence of laissez-faire, where detailed
studies by Myers and Haraowy exist: Nor even with Adam Smith's much
publicized criticism of the Mercantilists on Foreign Trade; it was
explicitly stated by such "typical" Mercantilists as Malachy
Postlethwayt that Foreign Trade was to be considered a political
problem and it is therefore not very meaningful to compare Smith and
his predecessors on this issue.
Until quite recently, Adam Smith's Price Theory drew praise
largely because it was seen as the starting point of meaningful econo-
mic analysis. Alec Macfie notes this fact and regrets the emphasis on
Adam Smith's analytics that it has encouraged.
One aspect of the great man, probably that which
suits later conditions, is chosen, much of the
rest probably rejected. The section of Smith's
work which was so chosen and developed till it be-
came supreme was the first two books of the Wealth
of Nations . The theory of static equilibrium there
so carefully sketched has grown into an analytic
system and method which has for long dominated
English-speaking universities, and our universities
-3-
today control our theory as never before in modern
times. It is a paradox of history that the
analytics of Book I, in which Smith took his own
line, should have eclipsed the philosophic and
historical methods in which he so revelled and
which showed his Scots character.
What Macfie, in common with most other scholars, fails to do is to
note whether and how far Adam Smith's analytics in Books I and II of
the Wealth of Nations were in fact advances on contemporary opinion.
In recent years the merits of Adam Smith's analysis of the market
have been most forcefully (and independently) argued by Marian Bowley
and by Samuel Hollander. It is notable that neither scholar gives
careful attention to the eighteenth century pamphlet literature.
Hollander's chapter has no direct references (presumably he considers
the references given in an earlier chapter to suffice) while Bowley
provides direct comparison only with the Scholastics and with
Cantillon. Even if such a comparison were accurately done it would be
most unfair to the rich pamphlet literature arising since 1660. One
needs to go no further than J. R. McCulloch's Selected Tracts to find
that considerable awareness of the workings of self-interest in the
market is shown by Daniel Defoe in Giving Alms no Charity or by the
anonymous author of An Apology for Pawnbroking. It will be shown
below that our interpretation of what Adam Smith actually said does
not differ from Bowley or Hollander on many occasions; that our eval-
uations nonetheless differ is perhaps largely attributable to the
context within which we place Smith. In section 3 several of Smith's
pretty applications are considered and an explanation offered for
Smith's success in providing such nice illustrations of market phenom-
enon.
-4-
The failure to grasp the sophistication of eighteenth-century
Microeconomics is perhaps the greatest defect in the existing litera-
cy
ture. Jacob Viner dropped a significant hint when he wrote that
On every detail, taken by itself, Smith appears to
have had predecessors in plenty. On a few details
was Smith as penetrating as the best of his pre-
decessors.
The extent to which Smith failed to climb to the level of his prede-
cessors is an issue deserving more careful consideration. It is not
claimed that the eighteenth century understanding of the market was
complete—only that Smith had nothing to add to what already existed.
He never went ahead, and frequently stayed behind, the best views of
his predecessors.
One important methodological point, which guides the criticism of
this essay, needs to be cleared at the outset. Trite though it may
sound, theorists must theorize and be judged for their theories. To
provide us with a wonderful array of anecdotes, stories and facts as
well as a fund of insightful observations is no doubt a contribution
—
but it is not theorizing. It is up to the theorist to tell us the
essence of the matter— the crux of his theoretical insight—and it is
illegitimate for modern scholars to extract such ideas out of other,
non-theoretical parts of a book. The enormous size of the Wealth of
Nations has encouraged an unfortunate methodology whereby the expli-
citly theoretical portions are given equal weight with observations
and historical facts. Scholars range at will and show us that the
theory explicitly proposed is not fully representative of A.dam Smith's
9
"general" view. This procedure forgets that it was Smith's respon-
sibility to do his own theorizing.
-5-
II. The famous beginning of the Wealth of Nations concerns the divi-
sion of labor. It is well known that Smith held the division of labor
to be the prime reason for increases in productivity, and hence, for
economic growth, whether such a view is true or not, it has no
bearing on this paper because the division of labor is a technological
feature and its adoption is something internal to a firm, while we are
concerned primarily with markets and prices. Hence the nature of the
division of labor is not something to be directly explained by
"economics" (as we understand it) but the extent to which the division
of labor is practiced leads us directly to the market.
Since the division of labor is regulated by the extent of the
market the first requirement for a deeper understanding of economic
prosperity lies in describing the working of the market. This is
attempted by Adam Smith in Chapter VII of Book I entitled, "Of the
Natural and Market Price of Commodities." As the title indicates,
Smith distinguishes between "Natural" and "Market" Price and the
former is clearly the more fundamental of the two. '-That then deter-
mines Natural Price?
Smith begins by telling us that in every society, at any given
time, there exists an ordinary or average rate of wages, profits and
rent «7hich are determined by circumstances which have little to do
with the price of individual commodities. These average rates for
each factor of production Smith calls the natural rate and defines the
natural price as the sura of the natural rates of wages, profits and
rents. This price is distinguished from the market price, which is
merely another name for whatever price reigns in the market at any
11time.
-6-
The actual price at which any commodity is sold is
called its market price. It may either be above,
or below, or exactly the same with its natural
price.
Those individuals who are willing to pay the natural price of a
commodity have a special role to play. Their demand constitutes what
is called the "effectual demand" and market price is said to arise out
of the interplay of the actual supply and the desires of the effectual
demanders.
The market price of every particular commodity is
regulated by the proportion between the quantity
which is actually brought to market, and the
demand of those who are willing to pay the natural
price of the commodity.
TTie explicit theoretical construct thus consists of juxtaposing a
point supply and a point demand. This is an awkward way of for-
mulating the market pricing process, especially since Smith's sub-
sequent description makes it clear that in cases of excess supply new
buyers enter the market and in cases of deficient supply some effec-
tual demanders have to "leave" the market.
If, however, we gloss over the location of equilibrium, i.e., the
natural price, and ask instead how Smith describes what happens when
13
we are not in equilibrium, the treatment is excellent.
When the quantity of any commodity which is brought
to market falls short of the effectual demand, all
those who are willing to pay the whole value of
the rent, wages, and profit, which must be paid in
order to bring It thither, cannot be supplied with
the quantity which they want. Rather than want it
altogether, some of them will be willing to give
more. A competition will immediately begin among
them, and the market price will rise more or less
above the natural price, according as either the
greatness of the deficiency, or the wealth and
wanton luxury of the competitors, happen to animate
more or less the eagerness of the competition.
-7-
Smith then treats of the opposite case, i.e., when supply exceeds
effectual demand and shows just as clearly that an excess supply will
cause price to fall and lead to a restriction in supply. The general
tenor of Smith's argument regarding adjustments of price is quite
14
modern and leads to the conclusion that
The natural price, therefore, is, as it were, the
central price, to which the prices of all commodi-
ties are continually gravitating.
Given the centrality of natural prices in Smith's schema, what we
need is an adequate theory of natural prices. Since natural price is
defined as the sum of natural wages, profits and rents, this requires
an explanation of the natural rates of wages, profits and rents.
However Smith's statement of the most important features determining
the natural rates does not seem to have any role for microeconomics.
There is in every society or neighbourhood an ordi-
nary or average rate both of wages and profit in
every different employment of labour and stock.
This rate is naturally regulated, as 1 shall show
hereafter, partly by the general circumstances of
the society, their riches or poverty, their advanc-
ing, stationary, or declining condition; and partly
by the particular nature of each employment.
There is likewise in every society or neighbourhood
an ordinary or average rate of rent, which is regu-
lated too, as 1 shall show hereafter, partly by the
general circumstances of the society or neighbour-
hood in which the land is situated, and partly by
the natural or improved fertility of the land.
These ordinary or average rates may be called the
natural rates of wages, profit, and rent, at the
time and place in which they commonly prevail.
When the price of any commodity is neither more nor
less than what is sufficient to pay the rent of the
land, the wages of the labour, and the profits of
the stock employed in raising, preparing, and bring-
ing it to market, according to their natural rates,
-8-
the commodity is then sold for what may be called
its natural price.
So the natural rates are set, first, by the macroeconomic health of
the economy and secondly, by various technical and sociological
features of different employments. Smith has provided us with a
dichotomy between factor pricing and goods pricing. If it could be
sustained, this would be an important contribution.
The next step is to specify each of the natural rates that serve
to constitute the natural price. Chapter VIII of Book. I attempts to
determine the natural rate of wages. A careful reading of this chap-
ter, however, shows that, amidst a great many digressions, all that is
established is tlTe existence of a lower bound on real wages; this
lower bound is set by the condition that workers should be enabled to
reproduce themselves. In a rather terse version of the Malthusian
argument Smith points out that if wages do not permit reproduction,
labor supply will fall and force wages to rise while if wages are more
than adequate for reproduction, labor supply will increase and cause
wages to fall.
It is in this manner that the demand for men, like
that for any other commodity, necessarily regulates
the production of men; quickens it when it goes on
too slowly, and stops it when It advances too fast.
It will be noted that this mechanism must take at least a dozen years,
since a new generation has to be raised, and nothing specific is said
about the rate of wages in the interim.
Smith lays emphasis upon the fact that wages rise, not in
countries which are rich, but in countries which are growing richer.
-9-
The increased demand for labor in such growing economies always suc-
ceeds in keeping ahead of the reproductive cycle and so wages can keep
on rising. This is most spectacularly seen in North America, the
fastest growing part of the world.
Labor is there [American colonies] so well rewarded
that a numerous family of children, instead of being
a burden, is a source of opulence and prosperity to
the parents. The labor of each child, before it can
leave the house, is computed to be a hundred pounds
clear gain to them.
This observation is certainly accurate, but it leaves Smith's ana-
lytical structure incomplete. Both Europe and North America are
stated to be growing economies, the former much more slowly than the
former. In neither continent can wages be at their natural level. At
what level then are they set?
The same difficulty faces us in the next chapter on profits. Once
again we have several digressions, some of which are highly inter-
esting, but one looks in vain for a clear-cut paragraph which will
tell us what the natural rate of profit is at any given time and
place. Instead, what we are told is that the natural rate of profit
declines as a country becomes richer. While wages rise as a country
continues along its course of growth, profits do just the opposite.
The argument is based on an analogy between the trade for a single
commodity with the trade of the entire economy.
When the stocks of many rich merchants are turned
into the same trade, their mutual competition
naturally tends to lower its profit; and when there
is a like increase of stock in all the different
trades carried on in the same society, the same
competition must produce the same effect in them
all.
-10-
This explanation is expanded a little later, where the increased com-
petition of traders is attributed to the gradually increasing dif-
ficulty of finding "a profitable method of employing any new capital."
Once again we are provided with some interesting observations, but no
help in determining natural profits. Without an explanation for its
two principal components, wages and profits, the analytical structure
of market price is left hanging in mid-air. Mark Blaug's comment is
• i •
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entirely appropriate.
A cost-of-product ion theory of the value of a
commodity is obviously empty and meaningless if
it does not include some explanation of how the
prices of productive services are determined. But
Adam Smith had no consistent theory of wages and
rents and no theory of profit or pure interest at
all. To say that the normal price of an article is
the price that just covers money costs is to explain
prices by prices. In this sense, Adam Smith had no
theory of value whatever.
There is a pause in the continuity of the argument while Smith
deals with the causes of the inequalities in wages and profits across
various occupations. In Chapter XI of Book 1 Smith turns to the rent
of land. In earlier chapters Smith occasionally refers to average
rents and speaks of rents as though rent is another component of price,
on all fours with wages and profit. This loose language is shed in
the first half of this chapter and we have an excellent exposition of
20
rent, which left Malthus and Ricardo little to improve upon.
Rent, it is to be observed, therefore, enters into
the composition of the price of commodities in a
different way from wages and profit. High or low
wages and profit, are the causes of high or low
price; high or low rent is the effect of it. It is
because high or low wages and profit must be paid,
in order to bring a particular commodity to market,
that its price is high or low. But it is because
-li-
lts price is high or low; a great deal more, or
very little more, that it affords a high rent, or
a low rent, or no rent at all.
After such a clear exposition of the price mechanism one is
surprised to find a quite different story told later in the chapter.
A. different set of principles, it appears, governs the rents of coal
21
mines
.
The most fertile coal mine regulates the price of
coals at all the other mines in its neighbourhood.
Both the proprietor and the undertake of the work
find, the one that he can get a greater rent, the
other that he can get a greater profit, by some-
what underselling all their neighbours. Their
neighbours are soon obliged to sell at the same
price, though they cannot so well afford it, and
though it always diminishes, and sometimes takes
away altogether both their rent and their profit.
Some works are abandoned altogether; others can
afford no rent, and can be wrought only by the
proprietor.
Immediately after this extraordinary passage Smith correctly notes
that the cost of production at that mine which pays no rent must be a
good indicator of the lowest price at which the commodity be sold!
That Smith was unclear in his own mind as to the role of rent may
be seen by turning to his treatment of rent in an earlier chapter.
When supply is deficient, we are told, some component of natural price
must be above its natural level. So far so good. Smith, however,
chooses rent as an example of a return that can exceed its natural
rate." Not only does this contradict Smith's own observation that
rents are less affected by fluctuations of market prices than wages or
profits, it also disguises the more plausible sequence whereby high
profits are earned on the limited supply, the high profits thereafter
leading to a greater cultivation of lands and eventually to higher
-12-
rents. A little later, Smith points out that natural causes may keep
the market price above the natural price for long periods of time. To
illustrate this, Smith refers to commodities such as special French
wines which require land of such singular quality that the entire
23
supply of such land is inadequate to meet the "effectual demand."
Some natural productions require such a singularity
of soil and situation, that all the land in a great
country, which is fit for producing them, may not be
sufficient to supply the effectual demand. The
whole quantity brought to market, therefore, may be
disposed of to those who are willing to give more
than what is sufficient to pay the rent of the land
which produced them, together with the wages of the
labour, and the profits of the stock which were
employed in preparing and bringing them to market,
according to their natural rates. Such commodities
may continue for the whole centuries together to be
sold at this high price.
Not only is it difficult to find an adequate definition of "effectual
demand" in such cases but the fact that market price could exceed
natural price "for whole centuries together" should give one pause to
consider whether the distinction between natural and market prices is
even worthwhile in such cases.
The most recent editors of the Wealth of Nations have praised
O /i
Smith's treatment of the determination of market price." "This
section of Smith's work is perhaps among the best from a purely
analytical point of view, and is quite remarkable for the formality
with which the argument unfolds." The subsequent discussion by
Campbell and Skinner fails to make clear that Smith's analytical
apparatus is based upon a dichotomy between product and factor markets
and that its effective use requires us to know the natural rates of
wages, profits and rents; that Smith fails to give us any guidance as
-13-
to the level of natural wages In any country that Is not stationary,
of natural profits in any country at all, and provides an account of
natural rents in a way that would confuse any careful reader. If,
however, we accept that there is such a thing as natural price, to
which market price must tend, then the process of adjustment is very
clearly described. Those students of the Wealth of Nations who
believed they understood the functioning of the market after reading
Book I probably had a sufficient understanding of the market mechanism
when they began, so that they were able to find their way through
Smith's confusion.
-14-
III. If Adam Smith's analytics are of little use then perhaps it was
his shrewd illustrations that served to educate future generations?
There is certainly considerable truth in such a claim. There are many
instances in which Adam Smith provides us with convincing illustrations
of opportunity cost and of the equalization of returns in different
uses. Chapter X of Book I deals with "Wages and Profit in the Differ-
ent Employments of Labour and Stock." It is a beautiful exercise in
tracing, for example, differences in money wages to differences in the
prestige of different jobs, or of differences in profits to differ-
ences in the risk associated with different activities. Despite some
occasional lapses from clarity, it is well-deserving of the praise
25bestowed upon it by Wakefield in 1843."
This, one of the most admired and most admirable
chapters in the Wealth of Nations
, is allowed on
all hands to be free from error, and to contain,
even now, the only complete account of the subject
to which it relates.
Nor is Smith's use of such reasoning limited to this famous
chapter. There Is a fine development of this theme in the discussion
9 ft
of the relative profitability of tillage versus pasture.
Corn is an annual crop, butcher 's-meat , a crop which
requires four or five years to grow. As an acre of
land, therefore, will produce a much smaller quantity
of the one species of food than of the other, the
inferiority of the quantity must be compensated by
the superiority of the price. If It was more than
compensated, more corn land would be turned into
pasture; and if it was not compensated, part of
what was In pasture would be brought back into corn.
27The same point is also developed later."
When the price of cattle, for example, rises so high
that it is as profitable to cultive land in order to
raise food for them, as in order to raise food for
-15-
man, it cannot well go higher. If it did, more corn
land would soon be turned into pasture.
And in an extended discussion of the profitability of raising
cattle, which is too long to be quoted in its entirety, Smith notes
both the problem of joint costs and how it affects the allocation of
land. 28
Whatever regulations tend to sink the price either
of wool or of raw hides below what it naturally
would be, must, in an improved and cultivated
country, have some tendency to raise the price of
butcher ' s-meat . The price both of the great and
small cattle, which are fed on improved and cul-
tivated land, must be sufficient to pay the rent
which the landlord, and the profit which the
farmer has reason to expect from improved and cul-
tivated land. If it is not, they will soon cease
to feed them. Whatever part of this price, there-
fore, is not paid by the wool and the hide, must be
paid by the carcase. The less there is paid for
the one, the more must be paid for the other. In
what manner this price is to be divided upon the
different parts of the beast, is indifferent to
the landlords and farmers, provided it is all
paid to them.
Even though Adam Smith did not provide any explicit theoretical
guidelines that are particularly valuable one cannot fail to ask—what
principles did guide Smith in making the perceptive and accurate
observations provided above? The views expressed on the Law of
Settlements for the poor perhaps gives us a clue. The law itself was
believed by Smith to have restricted the mobility of labor and Smith
therefore ascribed to the law not only the great differences in the
price of labor in contiguous areas but also indignantly exclaimed
29
that'
There is scarce a poor man in England of forty years
of age, I will venture to say, who has not in some
part of his life felt himself most cruelly oppressed
by this ill-contrived law of settlements.
-16-
This strong assertion has drawn the critical attention of several of
Smith's editors. Campbell and Skinner make a pointed remark regarding
Smith's indifference to providing factual details to support his asser-
tion. 30
The general principles, the opposition to restric-
tions damaging to the free allocation of resources,
were held so strongly that there seemed no case to
answer.
This observation is pregnant with consequences which have not been
developed.
If Smith indeed began by assuming that any violation of natural
liberty was both morally wrong and economically harmful, how far could
such a position take him into analytical economics? First, Smith's
procedure needs to consider the absence of competition on only one
side of the market. In the case of the Law of Settlements, for
example, Smith did not proceed to ask whether masters might not find
it profitable to find ways of evading the law. This is just what
31later critics, such as Sir F. M. Eden, contended. Secondly, if we
assume that a market reaches a stable equilibrium, then the belief in
one-sided competition alone suffices to provide several analytical
results. For example, in the version of Ricardian Rent Theory es-
poused by Piero Sraffa, the same final outcome is reached whether only
farmers compete (for land) or only landlords compete (for farmers).
This one-sided analytical procedure works best when there are constant
returns to scale and the assumption of fixed proportions, used on
several occasions by Smith, is perhaps a consequence of his analytical
32
method.
-17-
It is ray belief that Smith thoroughly appreciated—and made his
readers appreciate—the fundamental fact that a genuinely competitive
market leads to zero-profits. This observation is repeatedly and suc-
cessfully applied to such fields as the choice of occupations, the
preference for pasturage over tillage or the determination of joint
prices. It will even suffice to move us towards the "natural price,"
wherever that might be. If one re-examines Smith's concepts "natural"
price, or any of its components, it is evident that the concepts are
so defined that, any deviation implies the existence of a profitable
venue of activity,—and hence encourages resource movements in a free
economy. The fundamental principle was widely known and appreciated
as may be seen from the two pamphlets earlier referred to, Defoe's
Giving Alms No Charity and An Apology for Pawnbroking . (These
examples can be readily multiplied.) The repetition of fundamentals
is however the principal tool of good pedagogy. Smith's exposition
undoubtedly contributed to the wider understanding of the market
mechanism.
Apart from the wide extent and deep appreciation for the market
visible in the general run of economic pmaphleteering it is instruc-
tive to contrast Smith with Sir James Steuart. The Common Knowledge
of an age is most evident when individuals with the most divergent
views employ the same ideas. An examination of Steuart and Smith on
the workings of competition clearly shows that Steuart was as knowl-
34
edgeable as Smith. Nor should this surprise us. Steuart was con-
cerned with telling an intelligent statesman how to devise rules which
-18-
would move a free economy in desired directions. In modern ter-
minology, Steuart's statesman was a Stackleberg leader and it is
elementary that such an agent has to know the reaction functions of
the followers—in this case the competitive market.
If then, Adam Smith is to be credited with having provided us with
an understanding of the market mechanism, the case must rest not on
his theoretical treatment, but rather on the process of adjustment to
equilibrium and on the many insightful examples that Smith presented.
Given the weakness of Smith's own analytical constructs, in assessing
the merits of this achievement, it is necessary to spend only a little
space on the theory and application of the price mechanism by Smith's
predecessors
.
-19-
IV. In looking over the literature prior to Adam Smith it is possible
to take a European view, as Schurapeter did, and find antecedents for
Smith's ideas in the works of the Scholastics and the Natural-Law
philosophers. Due to limitations of space, this is the only group to
be directly quoted here. Max Beer provided a striking example from
the thirteenth century in Richard of Middleton, who formulated a
rudimentary two-country, two good model to explain the benefits of
35trade
.
Let us envisage two countries, A and B, unequally
endowed by nature. A produces corn in abundance,
but little wine, while country B has an abundance
of wine and a deficiency of corn. We know that the
market price or the just price of a commodity varies
according to its plentifulness or scarcity. The
same commodity when plentiful is less appreciated
than when it is scarce. In this manner a sextarium
of corn in country A will be cheaper than in country
B, while conversely a doliura of wine in country A
will be dearer than in country B. Now, it is natu-
ral for the business of trade and commerce to equal-
ize supply. The merchant, then, buys corn cheap in
country A and sells it at the higher market price
that is ruling in country B, or he buys wine cheap
in country B and sells it at the higher market price
that is ruling in country A, so that in reality the
consumer is not in the least overcharged, for he
pays for each commodity the normal price, the just
price, which is ruling in his respective country.
The exchanges are equal, yet the merchant earns his
profit, and he does so rightfully, for, far from
having injured either country, he brought benefit
to both . His profit is therefore neither usury nor
turpe lucrum. The same rule of equality applies
also to the business transactions of individuals in
their own country. The commodity which the consumer
receives is of more immediate utility to him than
the money he gives for it, while to the merchant the
money he receives for his commodity is of greater
immediate utility than the commodity which he sur-
renders, so that both draw equal benefits from the
exchange. (emphasis added)
20-
The value of scholastic economic thought has subsequently been
impressed upon us by Marjorie Gr ice-Hutchison, Raymond de Roover,
Barry Gordon and, most recently, Odd Langholm. Here is Azpilcueta
on the quantity theory of money. Note the pertinence of the example
in sixteenth century Spain (1556), the explicit ceteris paribus
clause, as well as the comparative historical method.
other things being equal, in countries where there
is a great scarcity of money, all other saleable
goods, and even the hands and labour of men, are
given for less money than where it is abundant.
Thus we see by experience that in France, where
money is scarcer than in Spain, bread, wine, cloth
and labour are worth much less. And even in Spain,
in times when money was scarcer, saleable goods and
labour were given for very much less than after the
discovery of the Indies, which flooded the country
with gold and silver. The reason for this is that
money is worth more where and when it is scarce
than where and when it is abundant. What some men
say, that a scarcity of money bringd down other
things, arises from the fact that its excessive
rise [in value] makes other things seem lower, just
as a short man standing beside a very tall one
looks shorter than when he is beside a man of his
own height
.
Finally, Juan de Lugo writes very clearly in 1642 that price fluc-
tuates because of the subjective desires of the majority in the
market
:
not because of the intrinsic and substantial per-
fection of the articles—since mice are more per-
fect than corn, and yet are worth less—but on
account of their utility in respect of human need,
and then only on account of estimation; for jewels
are much less useful than corn in the house, and
yet their price is much higher. And we must take
into account not only the estimation of prudent
men, but also that of the imprudent, if they are
sufficiently numerous in a place. This is why
our glass trinkets are in Ethiopia justly exchanged
for gold, because they are commonly more esteemed
there. And among the Japanese old objects made of
-21-
iron and pottery, which are worth nothing to us,
fetch a high price because of their antiquity.
Communal estimation, even when foolish, raises the
natural price of goods, since price is raised by
abundance of buyers and money, and lowered by the
contrary factors.
While the manner of secular writers in the early modern period may
have been more attractive, they did not show any considerable advance
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in economic principles over the best scholastics.
Be that as it may, the point to be made here concerns not just
influence in the sense of glimpsing the mountain peaks reached by the
best minds but rather the sort of influence imbibed simply by being
part of a common culture. The extremely commercialized nature of
British society has been ignored by economists. In this sense, which
is most germane to the thesis proposed here, it is readily documented
that
(a) Monopoly was carefully defined by the English in the late six-
teenth century and its detriment to social welfare clearly ob-
served. Adam Smith's casual hyperbole that "The price of
monopoly is upon every occasion the highest which can be got"
K 1 A 38is a step backwards.
(b) The paradox of value or the diamonds-water paradox had been
both posed and solved by several economists, such as John
T
39
Law.
(c) The use of competition as a standing if implicit assumption
was widespread and the notion of short-run and long-run clearly
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emphasized by such famous economists as John Locke. As for
Smith's explicit analytical apparatus, consisting of a point
-22-
deraand and a point supply, this also shows little advance on
John Locke.
Unlike a modern price theorist, Locke did
not see price as the result of the interaction
of two functional relationships which are
defined for a given moment in time. Instead,
he always describes price as an exchange ratio
which is determined by a set of proportions
involving the quantity of a good (the stock
available) and its vent (a flow).
(d) "Demand and Supply" (in the loose, pre-Marshallian sense) were
widely and correctly used—indeed the workings of this
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mechanism were treated as a truism, e.g. , Dudley North says
as corn, wool & e when they come to market
greater quantities than there are buyers to
deal for, the price will fall; so if there be
more lenders than borrowers, interest will
also fall.
As more buyers than sellers raiseth the price
of a commodity, so more borrowers than lenders
will raise interest.
Note that North takes the mechanism completely for granted for
the case of goods and seeks to explain its workings in the
case of the interest rate. W. Thweatt has provided many neat
examples of the actual use of "Demand" and "Supply" in the
late eighteenth century.
(e) The ahistorical approach used hitherto is exemplified in the
way "natural price" is seen as prescient of capitalist
society. Adam Smith's use of the word "natural" is somewhat
peculiar because Smith appears to focus upon the long-run
stationary state which is an odd context because his primary
concern is with economic growth . Before Smith the notion of a
-23-
short-run equilibriam price around which day-to-day fluctua-
tions would occur was already well established. The New Whole
44
Duty of Man says
So long as you keep within the latitude of law-
ful gain you may use your skill against another
man in driving a bargain: for in an ordinary
plenty of commodities there is an ordinary price
,
which those that deal with them know and under-
stand [emphasis added].
By the 1750' s economists such as Joseph Massie and Malachy
Postlethwayt were already using the word "natural" to qualify
words like "interest" or "price" without being self-conscious.
Richard Cantillon uses "natural" somewhat in Smith's sense,
but Cantillon' s usage was not general. Since Smith's views on
allocation of resources also follow Cantillon closely, this is
almost surely Smith's source. It is a pity that Schurapeter did
not live to complete his History
,
since it is hard to reconcile
the praise for Smith's analytics (earlier quoted) with the
F 11 A 46following
:
Cantillon paid much attention to the problem
of market price as distinguished from normal
price—exactly as did A.. Smith later on. One
feature of his treatment is worth noting
because it persisted practically to J. S. Mill.
Like all "classics" of the nineteenth century,
Ricardo especially, Cantillon never asked the
question how market price is related to
normal price and precisely how the latter
emerges— if indeed it does emerge—from the
supply and demand mechanism that produces the
former. Taking this relation for granted, he
was led to treat market price as a separate
phenomenon and to restrict the supply and
demand explanation to it . Thus emerged the
superficial and, as the later development of
the theory of value was to show, misleading
formula—normal price is determined by cost,
market price is determined by supply and
demand.
-24-
Thoraas Pownall was quite worried by the sharp distinction
Smith drew between "market price" and "natural price." Given
the highly favorable connotations of "natural," Pownall felt
that one could be led to assume that interventions against the
"market price" and in favor of the "natural price" might be
needed. 3y the 1820' s, T. R. Malthus could only provide a
lame justification for Smith's peculiar use of natural
price,
(f) There is no suggestion in the literature prior to Adam Smith
that factor prices were somehow different in nature from goods
prices. By emphasizing this point Smith served to turn eco-
nomics into a blind alley for almost a century. Malthus, one
of Smith's greatest admirers, realized Smith's deficiency by
the time he came to write his Principles and asked why demand
and supply could not determine natural price (or the long run
cost of production) as well as the market price. Such words
fell on the deaf ears of the Ricardians and Ricardo replied
defiantly
The author forgets Adam Smith's definition of
natural price or he would not say that demand
and supply could determine its natural price.
Natural price is only another name for cost
of production. When any commodity sells for
that price which will repay the wages for
labour expended on it, will also afford rent,
and profit at their then current rate, Adam
Smith would say that commodity was at its
natural price. Now these charges would remain
the same, whether commodities were much or
little demanded, whether they sold at a high
or low market price.
It was not until the Marginal Revolution that the ill effects
of Smith's dichotomy could be left behind.
-25-
V. From the time of publication of the Wealt h of Nations in 1776 till
the middle of the twentieth century, Adam Smith has been viewed
primarily as the source of laissez-faire ideas. The benefits of
49
economic freedom can be argued on the basis of three axioms
1. Individuals desire to maximize their wealth.
2. Individuals know better than governments how to maximize
their own wealth.
3. National wealth is the sum of individual wealth.
This is an effective argument for Free-Trade and it never really re-
quires an understanding of the microeconomics of demand and supply.
It is quite unfortunate that, in recent years, economists have
tried to claim that Smith was not only a vigorous advocate of Free
Trade but also an economic theorist of some merit. The strong claim
that Smith was prescient about modern capitalism not only founders on
Smith's treatment of contemporary facts, it also makes one wonder how
such quaint rules for the allocation of capital could be espoused by
an appreciator of capitalism or why he would support the legal regu-
lation of interest rates, after having provided very good grounds for
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leaving them free.
It has been argued in this paper that even the weaker claim that
Adam Smith synthesized and improved contemporary understanding of the
market is dubious. Lord Keynes was generally appreciative of the
"Macroeconomics" of Mercantilism but he seriously misled his readers
when, with reference to the basic tools of Economics, he wrote that
before Adam Smith this apparatus of thought
scarcely existed. *
-26-
That Smith doubted the mutually beneficial nature of the worker-
capitalist relation, as is clearly noted in the earlier cited essay by
Douglas, is surely suggestive. More serious charges from the analyti-
cal point of view can also be made. Smith failed to appreciate the
role of utility and demand and confused issues on the measure of
value. He introduced a new concept of "natural" price, one that was
less useful than that used by his contemporaries, and he thrust upon
his readers the dichotomy between goods markets and factor markets.
For nearly two centuries Adam Smith was praised for his doctrine of
economic freedom and for having pointed to labor as the primary source
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of value. This praise had at least the merit of being well-grounded
in the text of the Wealth of Nations . It is high time that the modern
revision, which views Adam Smith as also being an analytical econo-
mist, be questioned.
-27-
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